PSIRT
ISO/IEC 29147 and ISO/IEC 30111: the two vulnerability standards explained
Two short ISO/IEC standards describe how a vendor deals with vulnerabilities in what it sells. ISO/IEC 29147 covers the outside: taking reports in and telling users. ISO/IEC 30111 covers the inside: verifying, fixing and releasing. This page explains what each one asks for, how they connect to IEC 62443-4-1, the FIRST PSIRT Services Framework and the Cyber Resilience Act, and what a small team needs in practice.
Updated
What are ISO/IEC 29147 and ISO/IEC 30111?
Both are international standards from ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27, the joint ISO and IEC subcommittee for information security, cybersecurity and privacy. They are written for vendors: anyone who makes a product or runs a service in which someone else may find a vulnerability. Together they describe the work a product security incident response team (PSIRT) does.
- ISO/IEC 29147, Vulnerability disclosure. In ISO's own abstract, it provides "requirements and recommendations to vendors on the disclosure of vulnerabilities in products and services": guidelines on receiving reports about potential vulnerabilities and on disclosing remediation information.
- ISO/IEC 30111, Vulnerability handling processes. It provides "requirements and recommendations for how to process and remediate reported potential vulnerabilities in a product or service".
The split is deliberate. 29147 says that the activities between receiving and disclosing a report are described in 30111, and 30111 is intended to be used with 29147. One faces the reporter and the user; the other faces your own engineering organization.
Both standards are sold by ISO, IEC and national standards bodies, so their full text is behind a paywall. This page describes them from ISO's published abstracts and the official previews (table of contents and introduction), and does not quote clause text. Buy the standards if you intend to claim conformance to them.
ISO/IEC 29147: vulnerability disclosure
29147 is about the interface between a vendor and everyone outside it. Its stated goal is to reduce the risk associated with exploiting vulnerabilities, by giving users the information they need to protect their systems. It names four roles: the user, the vendor, the reporter (who finds or passes on the vulnerability) and the coordinator (a third party, such as a national CSIRT, who helps when several vendors are involved or the reporter cannot reach the vendor).
It covers three things a team has to be able to do:
- Receive reports. Publish a way to reach you, acknowledge reports, communicate securely with the reporter and keep them informed.
- Publish a disclosure policy. The policy clause separates required, recommended and optional elements. The one required element is a preferred contact mechanism. Recommended elements cover what a report should contain, secure communication options, what reporters can expect and when, scope, how you publish and how you credit reporters. Legal considerations and a disclosure timeline are optional.
- Disclose remediation information. Publish advisories that identify the vulnerability, the affected products and versions, severity, the remediation, credit for the reporter and a revision history.
29147 also covers multi-vendor coordination, which its abstract calls "especially important": a vulnerability in a shared library or protocol stack affects every vendor who ships it, and disclosure has to be timed so that none of their users is left exposed. The practice side of all this (VDPs, security.txt, embargoes, CVE IDs) is covered in coordinated vulnerability disclosure; the advisory itself in security advisories and, in machine-readable form, CSAF.
ISO/IEC 30111: vulnerability handling processes
30111 starts where a report has arrived and ends after the fix has shipped. Its table of contents has three parts.
- Policy and organizational framework. Leadership commitment, a vendor PSIRT (or CSIRT) with a mission and responsibilities, and the roles of the product business division, customer support, public relations and legal.
- The handling process. Six phases: preparation, receipt, verification, remediation development, release and post-release. Alongside them, process monitoring (keeping records so the process can be measured and improved) and confidentiality of vulnerability information.
- Supply chain considerations. Vulnerabilities in components you got from someone else, and in your products that others build into theirs. For most modern products this is where the volume is: a CVE in an open-source dependency is a vulnerability in your product until you show otherwise.
The phases are the backbone of most PSIRT processes. The vulnerability management lifecycle walks through each one with what to record and who owns it.
How the two standards fit together
Read them as one process with two interfaces. 29147 governs the two moments where information crosses your boundary; 30111 governs everything that happens inside.
| Step | Standard | Faces |
|---|---|---|
| Publish a contact and policy | 29147 (30111 preparation relies on it) | Reporters |
| Receive and acknowledge a report | 29147 and 30111 receipt | Reporter |
| Verify, find affected products, prioritize | 30111 verification | Your teams |
| Build and test the fix | 30111 remediation development | Your teams |
| Ship the fix and publish the advisory | 30111 release and 29147 disclosure | Users, reporter, other vendors |
| Watch the fix, learn from the root cause | 30111 post-release | Your teams, users |
A team that implements only 29147 has a polite front door and nothing behind it. A team that implements only 30111 fixes things nobody outside hears about. Most organizations adopt both and write one procedure.
Current editions and revisions
As listed on iso.org, checked 13 November 2026:
| Standard | Current edition | Status | Next edition |
|---|---|---|---|
| ISO/IEC 29147 | 2018, second edition (published October 2018; replaced 29147:2014) | Reviewed and confirmed in 2024; marked "to be revised" (stage 90.92) | ISO/IEC AWI 29147, "Cybersecurity — Vulnerability disclosure processes", third edition: new project registered 8 October 2025 (stage 20.00) |
| ISO/IEC 30111 | 2019, second edition (published October 2019; replaced 30111:2013) | Reviewed and confirmed in 2025; marked "to be revised" (stage 90.92) | ISO/IEC WD 30111.2, "Cybersecurity — Vulnerability handling and disclosure processes", third edition: second working draft, comment period closed 1 August 2026 (stage 20.60) |
Two things stand out. The draft 30111 is retitled to cover handling and disclosure, and its abstract widens the audience from vendors to "anyone involved in handling vulnerabilities". Both revisions are still at the working draft stage, before a committee draft, enquiry or final vote, so a published third edition is some way off. The 2018 and 2019 editions are the ones to implement and cite today; check iso.org for the stage before you quote it.
What each activity means in practice
The standards describe outcomes, not tools. This is our mapping from their main activities to what a small product security team actually needs to have in place.
| Activity | From | What you need in practice |
|---|---|---|
| Receiving reports | 29147 |
A monitored address or form, a security.txt file pointing to it, an acknowledgment within a stated
time, a way to exchange details securely
|
| Disclosure policy | 29147 | A public page with contact, scope, what reporters can expect, how you credit and how you publish |
| Coordination | 29147 | Contacts for upstream maintainers, downstream vendors who embed your product, and your national CSIRT; an embargo procedure |
| Advisories | 29147 | An advisory template with identifiers, affected and fixed versions, severity, remediation, credit and revision history; a fixed place to publish; CSAF if large customers ask for it |
| Preparation | 30111 | Named owners, a severity method, an internal tracker, and an inventory of the components in every version you ship, usually an SBOM per release |
| Receipt | 30111 | One record per issue, whether it came from a researcher, a customer, your own testing or a new advisory for a component you use |
| Verification | 30111 | Reproduce, assess severity, list every affected product and version, and record which ones are not affected and why (a VEX statement is the machine-readable form) |
| Remediation development | 30111 | The owning engineering team builds and tests the fix or mitigation, tracked against a target date |
| Release | 30111 | Fixed versions shipped through your update channel, published together with the advisory |
| Post-release | 30111 | Watch for regressions and exploitation reports, answer customers, feed root causes back into development |
| Process monitoring | 30111 | Dates per phase for every issue, reviewed periodically, so you can show the process runs |
| Confidentiality | 30111 | Restricted access to unfixed vulnerability details, on a need-to-know basis |
| Supply chain | 30111 | Monitoring of third-party components for new vulnerabilities, and a way to tell downstream vendors when your component is affected |
A worked example
A researcher emails your security address: the web interface of your gateway ships a version of an open-source parsing library with a published remote code execution CVE.
- Receipt (29147, 30111). You acknowledge within the time your policy promises and open an internal record.
- Verification (30111). The question is not whether the library has the bug, but which of your releases contain the vulnerable version. Firmware 3.1 and 3.2 do; 3.0 used an older, unaffected version; the cloud console never used the library. You record all of that.
- Remediation (30111). The firmware team upgrades the library and ships 3.2.1. A rule in the build pipeline keeps the vulnerable version out of later builds.
- Disclosure (29147). You publish an advisory listing 3.1 and 3.2 as affected, 3.2.1 as fixed and 3.0 as not affected, with the CVE ID and credit to the researcher, and tell the two OEMs who embed your gateway before the public date.
Step 2 is where most of the time goes. If the component list per release is a spreadsheet or a scan of today's source tree, the answer for 3.1 is a guess. If you kept the SBOM of the build that produced each release, it is a lookup.
How they relate to IEC 62443-4-1
IEC 62443-4-1 sets secure development lifecycle requirements for suppliers of industrial automation and control system products. Its practice 6, management of security-related issues, has six requirements, and its practice 7 covers security update management. Mapped by requirement title (our mapping; the standards do not cross-reference each other by clause):
| IEC 62443-4-1 requirement | Closest ISO/IEC activity |
|---|---|
| DM-1 Receiving notifications of security-related issues | 29147 receiving reports; 30111 receipt |
| DM-2 Reviewing and DM-3 Assessing security-related issues | 30111 verification |
| DM-4 Addressing security-related issues | 30111 remediation development |
| DM-5 Disclosing security-related issues | 29147 disclosure and advisories; 30111 release |
| DM-6 Periodic review of security defect management practice | 30111 process monitoring |
| SUM-3 Dependent component or operating system security update documentation | 30111 supply chain considerations |
The practical difference: 62443-4-1 is assessed and certified (through ISASecure SDLA or certification bodies), and asks how mature each process is. Industrial vendors often use 29147 and 30111 as the detailed how-to and are audited against 62443-4-1.
How they relate to the FIRST PSIRT Services Framework
The FIRST PSIRT Services Framework (version 1.1, free) describes the same work as a catalogue of services in six areas: stakeholder ecosystem management, vulnerability discovery, vulnerability triage and analysis, remediation, vulnerability disclosure, and training and education. Discovery, triage, remediation and disclosure line up with the two ISO/IEC standards. Stakeholder management and training go further than either standard, and FIRST's companion PSIRT Maturity Document points back to 29147 and 30111.
A useful division of labour: use the ISO/IEC standards for the process you document and are measured against, and FIRST's framework to decide which services your team offers and how it is organized. The PSIRT guide covers the framework in more depth.
How they relate to the Cyber Resilience Act
The EU Cyber Resilience Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/2847) sets vulnerability handling requirements for manufacturers of products with digital elements in Annex I Part II, which applies from 11 December 2027. Read side by side, most of Part II is what 29147 and 30111 already describe:
| CRA Annex I Part II | Closest ISO/IEC activity |
|---|---|
| (1) Identify and document vulnerabilities and components, including an SBOM | 30111 preparation and supply chain considerations |
| (2) Address and remediate vulnerabilities without delay | 30111 verification and remediation development |
| (3) Regular tests and reviews of security | Outside both standards (secure development practice) |
| (4) Disclose fixed vulnerabilities once an update is available | 29147 advisories |
| (5) A coordinated vulnerability disclosure policy | 29147 disclosure policy |
| (6) A contact address for reporting vulnerabilities | 29147 receiving reports |
| (7) Secure distribution of updates | 30111 release (the mechanism itself is product engineering) |
| (8) Security updates disseminated without delay, with advisory messages | 30111 release and 29147 advisories |
Two CRA duties sit outside both standards. Point (1) names the SBOM explicitly, where 30111 only asks you to deal with supply chain components. And the reporting obligation, which has applied since 11 September 2026, has no counterpart in either: an early warning to the CSIRT designated as coordinator and ENISA within 24 hours of becoming aware of an actively exploited vulnerability, a notification within 72 hours and a final report, all through the Single Reporting Platform. A 29147 and 30111 process needs a branch for that. The CRA guide covers the rest.
The CRA harmonised standard for vulnerability handling
The Commission's standardisation request for the CRA (M/606), accepted by CEN, CENELEC and ETSI on 3 April 2025, includes a horizontal standard on vulnerability handling. CEN-CENELEC JTC 13 Working Group 9 is drafting it as EN 40000-1-3, Vulnerability handling, to cover Annex I Part II. In CEN-CENELEC material presented in early October 2026 it was still listed as a draft, prEN 40000-1-3. We have not found it cited in the Official Journal as of 13 November 2026, and only a cited harmonised standard gives a presumption of conformity. Following 29147 and 30111 is good preparation, since the CRA work draws on the same body of practice, but it does not give that presumption by itself. Check the CEN-CENELEC catalogue and the Official Journal for the current stage.
Do you need ISO 29147 or ISO 30111 certification?
No, and you cannot get it in the way you get ISO/IEC 27001. Neither standard is a management system standard (they are not on ISO's list of management system standards), and ISO itself does not certify anyone against any standard. We know of no accredited certification scheme for either. What vendors do instead:
- State that their process is aligned with ISO/IEC 29147 and 30111, and be ready to show the documents and records.
- Have a consultancy or customer audit the process against them, as part of a supplier assessment.
- Get an audited certificate for a framework that includes this work: IEC 62443-4-1 for industrial products, or ISO/IEC 27001 for the organization's information security management system.
Customers and auditors who ask about 29147 and 30111 usually want three things: a published disclosure policy, a documented handling process, and evidence that it runs, meaning records of real issues moving through it with dates.
Checklist for a small manufacturer
A first version you can put in place in a few weeks, in roughly this order:
- Name an owner for product security issues and a backup. One person is a PSIRT if the role is written down.
- Set up a monitored security contact and publish it in a
security.txtfile and on your website. - Publish a short disclosure policy: contact, scope, response times, how you credit and how you publish.
- Keep an SBOM for every version you release, from the build that produced it, and keep it as long as you support the version.
- Monitor those SBOMs for new vulnerabilities in the components, not only the latest release.
- Write a one-page handling procedure using the six 30111 phases, with a severity method and target times.
- Track every issue in one place with a date for each phase, including "not affected" decisions and why.
- Agree with each engineering team how security issues reach them and who decides on a fix.
- Create an advisory template and a fixed place to publish advisories; add CSAF when customers ask for it.
- Keep contacts for your upstream suppliers, downstream customers who embed your product, and your national CSIRT.
- If you sell into the EU, add the CRA reporting branch: who decides an issue is actively exploited, who prepares the early warning and who submits it.
- Review the process once a year against the records, and update the policy.
Where CRACI fits
CRACI supplies the evidence that makes the 30111 part fast: the inventory behind verification, and the routing behind remediation.
CRACI runs GitHub Actions builds on its own runners and records the packages each job actually fetched, including transitive dependencies, packages restored from CI caches and dependencies no lockfile lists. Each SBOM carries a completeness state and exports as CycloneDX or SPDX. Monitored SBOMs are re-evaluated continuously, and each package shows its advisories with their severity. Build history shows which past builds contained a vulnerable dependency, direct or transitive, so you know which releases were affected and for how long, within your retention period. The inventory view shows which software versions are deployed to which products.
From there, security teams triage findings and send them to the teams that own the fix, CRACI notifies the relevant people of a vulnerability and its severity, and CRACI supports VEX. Policy gates can block builds that contain a specific CVE, so a fixed vulnerability stays out of later releases. For the CRA, CRACI prepares the content of the early warning, notification and final report, and a person at the manufacturer submits them through the Single Reporting Platform. See vulnerability tracking and CRACI for PSIRT teams.
When CRACI is not the answer
- The 29147 side. CRACI does not take in reports from researchers or customers, track them as cases, or write or publish advisories. You still need a security contact, a disclosure policy, an issue tracker and a place to publish.
- Flaws in your own code. CRACI records the dependencies your builds pull in and does not scan source code. A report about a bug you wrote is verified from your source history and tests.
- Builds outside GitHub Actions. CRACI records GitHub Actions builds only today; GitLab CI and Jenkins are on the roadmap.
- Certification. CRACI does not certify or assess anything. It supplies records you can show an auditor or customer.
For the wider picture of where vulnerability handling sits in a security program, see product security.
ISO/IEC 29147 and 30111: frequently asked questions
What is ISO/IEC 29147?
ISO/IEC 29147 is the international standard for vulnerability disclosure. It gives vendors requirements and recommendations for receiving reports about potential vulnerabilities in their products and services and for disclosing remediation information, including what a disclosure policy and a security advisory should contain. The current edition is ISO/IEC 29147:2018.
What is ISO/IEC 30111?
ISO/IEC 30111 is the international standard for vulnerability handling processes: how a vendor processes and remediates reported potential vulnerabilities. It describes the policy and organization (including a PSIRT), six phases from preparation through receipt, verification, remediation development and release to post-release, and supply chain considerations. The current edition is ISO/IEC 30111:2019.
What is the difference between ISO 29147 and ISO 30111?
29147 covers the interface with the outside world: taking reports in and publishing advisories. 30111 covers what happens inside between those two moments: verifying the vulnerability, finding affected products, building and releasing the fix. They are designed to be used together.
Is there a newer version of ISO/IEC 29147 or 30111?
Not yet published. As of 13 November 2026, iso.org lists both current editions as "to be revised". A third edition of 29147, "Cybersecurity — Vulnerability disclosure processes", was registered as a new project in October 2025, and a third edition of 30111, retitled "Vulnerability handling and disclosure processes", is at the working draft stage. Implement the 2018 and 2019 editions until a new one is published.
Can you get certified to ISO 29147 or ISO 30111?
Not in the way you can for ISO/IEC 27001. Neither is a management system standard, ISO does not issue certificates, and we know of no accredited certification scheme for either. Vendors state alignment and show their policy, procedure and records. For an audited certificate that covers vulnerability handling, industrial vendors use IEC 62443-4-1.
Does following ISO 29147 and 30111 make you CRA compliant?
No. They cover much of the CRA's vulnerability handling requirements in Annex I Part II, such as a disclosure policy, a reporting contact, timely remediation and advisories. But the CRA also requires an SBOM and reporting of actively exploited vulnerabilities and severe incidents through the Single Reporting Platform, and only a harmonised standard cited in the Official Journal gives a presumption of conformity. The CRA's vulnerability handling standard, EN 40000-1-3, was still a draft in October 2026.
Are ISO 29147 and 30111 free?
No. Both are sold by ISO, IEC and national standards bodies. ISO's website publishes their abstracts, and official previews show the table of contents and introduction. The FIRST PSIRT Services Framework, which covers the same ground as a catalogue of services, is free.
Know which releases contain the vulnerable component
Verification is where handling slows down. Book a demo to see build history and triage to the owning team in CRACI.
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