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axios npm compromise: the hijacked releases that installed a RAT and how to check whether your builds are affected

On 31 March 2026, an attacker used the hijacked npm account of axios's lead maintainer to publish axios 1.14.1 and 0.30.4. Neither changed a line of axios itself. Each added one dependency, [email protected], whose install script downloaded a remote access trojan for macOS, Windows or Linux. The versions were on npm from 00:21 to 03:15 UTC, about three hours, but axios is one of the most downloaded packages on npm: just over 100 million downloads in the week before the attack. Any machine or CI job that installed either version in that window ran the dropper; treat it as compromised and rotate every secret it could read.

There is no CVE for this attack. If you are looking for "the axios vulnerability" of 2026, there are two different things: this compromise, tracked as GitHub malware advisory GHSA-fw8c-xr5c-95f9, and CVE-2026-40175, an unrelated header injection bug fixed in axios 1.15.0. This page is about the first.

What happened

Time (UTC)EventSource
Mid-March 2026A targeted social engineering campaign against the lead maintainer begins, about two weeks before the attackPostmortem
30 March, 05:57[email protected], a clean decoy, is published from a new account, nrwiseStepSecurity
30 March, 23:59[email protected], with the malicious install script, is publishednpm registry
31 March, 00:21[email protected] is published from the maintainer's account with [email protected] as a dependencyPostmortem
31 March, 01:00[email protected] is published with the same dependency. Community members report it; the attacker deletes their issuesPostmortem
31 March, 01:38An axios collaborator opens a pull request to deprecate the versions and contacts npmPostmortem
31 March, 03:15npm removes both axios versions; GitHub publishes GHSA-fw8c-xr5c-95f9Postmortem, GHSA
31 March, 03:29plain-crypto-js is removed from npmPostmortem
31 MarchGoogle's Threat Intelligence Group attributes the attack to UNC1069, a North Korea-nexus threat actorGoogle
2 AprilThe maintainer publishes a postmortem: his computer was compromised through social engineering and malwarePostmortem

StepSecurity reports that the account's email address had been changed to one the attacker controlled, and that the malicious releases lacked the trusted publishing binding and Git commit that legitimate axios releases carry, which suggests they were published with a long-lived npm token. The maintainer's postmortem lists the changes since: wiped devices and reset credentials, immutable releases and publishing only through OIDC.

Who is affected

Anyone who installed [email protected], [email protected] or [email protected] while they were on the registry, from 00:21 to 03:15 UTC on 31 March 2026: developer machines, CI jobs, Docker builds and anything that ran npx with a tool that depends on axios. You didn't need to depend on axios directly. A transitive dependency that allowed a range such as ^1.14.0 could resolve to 1.14.1 in a fresh install during the window.

The maintainer's postmortem puts the boundary plainly: "If you were already pinned to a clean version and didn't run a fresh install between 00:21 and 03:15 UTC on March 31, you're fine."

How it works

The attack combined a hijacked account with an install-time dropper:

  • A dependency, not a code change. The malicious axios versions were identical to the previous releases except for one new dependency. axios never imports plain-crypto-js; it existed only to run its postinstall script. The name imitates the real crypto-js library, a variant of typosquatting, and the clean 4.2.0 published 18 hours earlier gave the package a history.
  • A dropper per platform. According to StepSecurity, setup.js contacted sfrclak.com on port 8000 and fetched a second stage: on macOS a binary saved as /Library/Caches/com.apple.act.mond, on Windows a PowerShell script run from a copy of PowerShell saved as %PROGRAMDATA%\wt.exe, and on Linux and other systems a Python script saved as /tmp/ld.py. Errors were caught silently, so npm install still succeeded.
  • Cleaning up after itself. The dropper deleted setup.js and replaced its own package.json with a clean copy that reports version 4.2.0. After the install, npm ls could show [email protected]. The presence of the node_modules/plain-crypto-js directory is the reliable sign.
  • Still running after the step. StepSecurity saw a second connection to the server 36 seconds after npm install, from a detached process that outlived the install step. In CI, that means later steps, and the secrets they receive, can be exposed too.

GitHub's advisories class both packages as embedded malicious code (CWE-506) and say "Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised."

How to check whether you are affected

  1. Search every lockfile, on every branch that ran CI on 30 or 31 March 2026. The postmortem's check:
grep -E "axios@(1\.14\.1|0\.30\.4)|plain-crypto-js" package-lock.json yarn.lock 2>/dev/null

For every remote branch, and for pnpm too. Any match on plain-crypto-js means an affected version was resolved:

git fetch --all --quiet
for ref in $(git for-each-ref --format='%(refname:short)' refs/remotes); do
  git grep -nE 'plain-crypto-js|axios@(1\.14\.1|0\.30\.4)|axios-(1\.14\.1|0\.30\.4)\.tgz' "$ref" \
    -- '*package-lock.json' '*yarn.lock' '*pnpm-lock.yaml' | sed "s|^|$ref  |"
done
  1. Look for the installed package on machines and runners, not only in lockfiles:
find / -type d -name plain-crypto-js -path '*/node_modules/*' 2>/dev/null
  1. Search CI logs for runs on 31 March between 00:21 and 03:15 UTC that ran npm install, npm update, npx or a Docker build, and for the strings plain-crypto-js and [email protected].
  2. Search network and DNS logs for sfrclak.com, 142.11.206.73 and outbound connections to port 8000.

Why the lockfile doesn't settle it

A clean lockfile proves less than it seems:

  • Installs outside the lockfile. npx, npm install -g in a setup step, and npm install inside a Dockerfile or a build script all resolve versions on the spot.
  • Other branches and pull requests. A dependency update pull request that ran CI at 01:00 UTC on 31 March may have resolved axios to 1.14.1, even if it was never merged.
  • The installed package lies about its version. Because the dropper rewrote its own package.json, npm ls and tools that read node_modules can report [email protected].

You need a record of which package versions each build actually fetched. See are we affected? how to assess a new CVE across your builds and what a lockfile does and doesn't tell you.

How to fix it, and what to do if you can't patch yet

  1. If any machine or job installed an affected version, treat it as compromised. Rotate every secret it could read: npm and GitHub tokens, cloud credentials, deploy keys and anything in the job's environment, from a clean machine. For a developer machine, StepSecurity recommends isolating and rebuilding it rather than cleaning it.
  2. Move off the affected versions. The last clean versions before the attack were 1.14.0 and 0.30.3. The current releases, 1.21.1 and 0.35.0 on 16 November 2026, also fix CVE-2026-40175. Pin with overrides (npm) or resolutions (Yarn) if a dependency pulls axios in.
  3. Remove the dropper and clear caches:
rm -rf node_modules/plain-crypto-js
npm cache clean --force
gh cache delete --all --repo ORG/REPO   # GitHub Actions caches, per repository
  1. Rebuild artifacts from jobs that installed an affected version, from a clean install.
  2. Block sfrclak.com and 142.11.206.73 at your DNS, proxy or firewall.

Verify the cleanup

  1. No lockfile on any branch contains plain-crypto-js or axios 1.14.1 or 0.30.4.
  2. No node_modules/plain-crypto-js directory remains on any developer machine or self-hosted runner.
  3. The dropper's files are gone: /Library/Caches/com.apple.act.mond (macOS), %PROGRAMDATA%\wt.exe (Windows), /tmp/ld.py (Linux).
  4. The old credentials no longer work. Revoked npm tokens are gone from npm token list and old cloud keys are deactivated, not just replaced.
  5. The next build is clean. Check the versions it actually installed, from its log or per-build SBOM.

How to reduce the damage next time

  • Wait before adopting new versions. The malicious versions were live for three hours. A cooldown on dependency updates, which Dependabot and Renovate support, would have kept them out. StepSecurity points to npm's min-release-age setting in npm 11.10.0 and later.
  • Turn off install scripts where you can. npm ci --ignore-scripts would have stopped this dropper. npm v12 disables install scripts by default.
  • Limit where builds can connect. A build needs its package registries and a few APIs. The dropper's call to sfrclak.com:8000 fails when that host isn't allowed. See how an egress policy stops exfiltration from GitHub Actions. StepSecurity's own detection came from a CI run that connected to a host it had never contacted before.
  • Publish only through trusted publishing. The malicious releases came from a long-lived token, not the project's release workflow.

Check for compromise

IndicatorWhere to lookSource
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected] (or any version)Lockfiles, CI logs, SBOMsPostmortem
A node_modules/plain-crypto-js directoryMachines and self-hosted runnersStepSecurity
sfrclak.com, 142.11.206.73, port 8000, path /6202033DNS, proxy and firewall logsPostmortem, StepSecurity
/Library/Caches/com.apple.act.mond, /tmp/6202033macOSStepSecurity
%PROGRAMDATA%\wt.exe, %TEMP%\6202033.vbs, %TEMP%\6202033.ps1WindowsStepSecurity
/tmp/ld.py, a python3 process started by nohupLinuxStepSecurity

When to assume compromise. If any of these turn up, or a job installed an affected version, treat it as compromised, even if you find nothing else: the dropper removed its own traces. On ephemeral GitHub-hosted runners the machine is gone, but the secrets the job could read are not; rotate them and review cloud audit logs from 31 March onward.

What to tell your customers

If you ship software built with npm, customers will ask whether your product or your release pipeline was affected:

We checked every build of [product] between 30 March and 1 April 2026 for axios 1.14.1 and 0.30.4 and for plain-crypto-js. [No build installed an affected version.] / [Builds of [component] on [date] installed [version]; we rotated the credentials those builds could access and rebuilt [product] from a clean install as release [version].] The malicious code ran at install time and was not included in the axios code shipped in our product.

Check the last sentence against your own build before you send it. For a first holding statement and templates for each outcome, see how to answer customers after a supply chain attack.

How CRACI helps

CRACI runs your GitHub Actions jobs on its own runners (runs-on: craci) and records every package each job actually fetches from npm and other registries, including the hidden dependencies that install scripts, npx and build scripts pull in. Build history keeps every past build with its SBOM, so you can see which builds contained an affected version and when, within your retention period (180 days by default).

CRACI's egress policy limits where a job can connect, is validated before the job starts and fails closed. A job allowed to reach only its registries and the APIs it needs could not have reached sfrclak.com:8000, even on the night of the attack, before anyone knew the host. You are alerted when a job tries to reach a destination the policy doesn't allow.

CRACI flags known malicious releases that have a published CVE, and policy gates can block builds that contain one. The axios releases have GitHub malware advisories but no CVE, so look them up in the package record. CRACI doesn't detect malicious packages by behavior or reputation.

See the package record of one of your own builds

Related incidents: the chalk and debug npm compromise, Shai-Hulud. Other incidents: all vulnerabilities.

Sources and updates

Primary sources:

Research:

Updates:

  • 2026-11-16: First published.

Frequently asked questions

Which axios versions were compromised?

axios 1.14.1 and 0.30.4, both published on 31 March 2026 and removed from npm about three hours later. Each added a dependency on plain-crypto-js 4.2.1, which installed a remote access trojan. The last clean versions before them are 1.14.0 and 0.30.3.

Does the axios compromise have a CVE?

No. GitHub published malware advisories instead: GHSA-fw8c-xr5c-95f9 for axios and GHSA-2x9r-6wxq-hrr7 for plain-crypto-js, both classed as embedded malicious code (CWE-506). CVE-2026-40175, published in April 2026, is a separate, unrelated axios bug.

Is CVE-2026-40175 the axios supply chain attack?

No. CVE-2026-40175 is a header injection bug in axios's own code that a prototype pollution flaw in another dependency could exploit. It is fixed in axios 1.15.0 and 0.31.0 and rated 4.8 under CVSS 3.1 by its CNA. The supply chain attack was malicious releases published from a hijacked account and has no CVE.

Am I affected if my lockfile pins axios 1.14.0?

Not through that project, if every install used the lockfile. The maintainer's postmortem says you are fine if you were pinned to a clean version and didn't run a fresh install between 00:21 and 03:15 UTC on 31 March. Check tools installed with npx, global installs and other projects that resolve axios with a range such as ^1.14.0.

What should I do if a CI job installed axios 1.14.1 or 0.30.4?

Treat the job as compromised. Rotate every secret it could read, including npm and GitHub tokens, cloud credentials and deploy keys, check network logs for connections to sfrclak.com or 142.11.206.73 on port 8000, clear CI and npm caches, and rebuild anything the job produced from a clean install.

Who was behind the axios attack?

The maintainer's postmortem says the attacker gained access to his computer through a targeted social engineering campaign and malware, and took the npm credentials from there. Google's Threat Intelligence Group attributed the attack to UNC1069, a North Korea-nexus threat actor.