On 31 March 2026, an attacker used the hijacked npm account of axios's lead maintainer to publish axios 1.14.1 and 0.30.4. Neither changed a line of axios itself. Each added one dependency, [email protected], whose install script downloaded a remote access trojan for macOS, Windows or Linux. The versions were on npm from 00:21 to 03:15 UTC, about three hours, but axios is one of the most downloaded packages on npm: just over 100 million downloads in the week before the attack. Any machine or CI job that installed either version in that window ran the dropper; treat it as compromised and rotate every secret it could read.
There is no CVE for this attack. If you are looking for "the axios vulnerability" of 2026, there are two different things: this compromise, tracked as GitHub malware advisory GHSA-fw8c-xr5c-95f9, and CVE-2026-40175, an unrelated header injection bug fixed in axios 1.15.0. This page is about the first.
What happened
| Time (UTC) | Event | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Mid-March 2026 | A targeted social engineering campaign against the lead maintainer begins, about two weeks before the attack | Postmortem |
| 30 March, 05:57 | [email protected], a clean decoy, is published from a new account, nrwise | StepSecurity |
| 30 March, 23:59 | [email protected], with the malicious install script, is published | npm registry |
| 31 March, 00:21 | [email protected] is published from the maintainer's account with [email protected] as a dependency | Postmortem |
| 31 March, 01:00 | [email protected] is published with the same dependency. Community members report it; the attacker deletes their issues | Postmortem |
| 31 March, 01:38 | An axios collaborator opens a pull request to deprecate the versions and contacts npm | Postmortem |
| 31 March, 03:15 | npm removes both axios versions; GitHub publishes GHSA-fw8c-xr5c-95f9 | Postmortem, GHSA |
| 31 March, 03:29 | plain-crypto-js is removed from npm | Postmortem |
| 31 March | Google's Threat Intelligence Group attributes the attack to UNC1069, a North Korea-nexus threat actor | |
| 2 April | The maintainer publishes a postmortem: his computer was compromised through social engineering and malware | Postmortem |
StepSecurity reports that the account's email address had been changed to one the attacker controlled, and that the malicious releases lacked the trusted publishing binding and Git commit that legitimate axios releases carry, which suggests they were published with a long-lived npm token. The maintainer's postmortem lists the changes since: wiped devices and reset credentials, immutable releases and publishing only through OIDC.
Who is affected
Anyone who installed [email protected], [email protected] or [email protected] while they were on the registry, from 00:21 to 03:15 UTC on 31 March 2026: developer machines, CI jobs, Docker builds and anything that ran npx with a tool that depends on axios. You didn't need to depend on axios directly. A transitive dependency that allowed a range such as ^1.14.0 could resolve to 1.14.1 in a fresh install during the window.
The maintainer's postmortem puts the boundary plainly: "If you were already pinned to a clean version and didn't run a fresh install between 00:21 and 03:15 UTC on March 31, you're fine."
How it works
The attack combined a hijacked account with an install-time dropper:
- A dependency, not a code change. The malicious axios versions were identical to the previous releases except for one new dependency. axios never imports
plain-crypto-js; it existed only to run itspostinstallscript. The name imitates the realcrypto-jslibrary, a variant of typosquatting, and the clean 4.2.0 published 18 hours earlier gave the package a history. - A dropper per platform. According to StepSecurity,
setup.jscontactedsfrclak.comon port 8000 and fetched a second stage: on macOS a binary saved as/Library/Caches/com.apple.act.mond, on Windows a PowerShell script run from a copy of PowerShell saved as%PROGRAMDATA%\wt.exe, and on Linux and other systems a Python script saved as/tmp/ld.py. Errors were caught silently, sonpm installstill succeeded. - Cleaning up after itself. The dropper deleted
setup.jsand replaced its ownpackage.jsonwith a clean copy that reports version 4.2.0. After the install,npm lscould show[email protected]. The presence of thenode_modules/plain-crypto-jsdirectory is the reliable sign. - Still running after the step. StepSecurity saw a second connection to the server 36 seconds after
npm install, from a detached process that outlived the install step. In CI, that means later steps, and the secrets they receive, can be exposed too.
GitHub's advisories class both packages as embedded malicious code (CWE-506) and say "Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised."
How to check whether you are affected
- Search every lockfile, on every branch that ran CI on 30 or 31 March 2026. The postmortem's check:
grep -E "axios@(1\.14\.1|0\.30\.4)|plain-crypto-js" package-lock.json yarn.lock 2>/dev/null
For every remote branch, and for pnpm too. Any match on plain-crypto-js means an affected version was resolved:
git fetch --all --quiet
for ref in $(git for-each-ref --format='%(refname:short)' refs/remotes); do
git grep -nE 'plain-crypto-js|axios@(1\.14\.1|0\.30\.4)|axios-(1\.14\.1|0\.30\.4)\.tgz' "$ref" \
-- '*package-lock.json' '*yarn.lock' '*pnpm-lock.yaml' | sed "s|^|$ref |"
done
- Look for the installed package on machines and runners, not only in lockfiles:
find / -type d -name plain-crypto-js -path '*/node_modules/*' 2>/dev/null
- Search CI logs for runs on 31 March between 00:21 and 03:15 UTC that ran
npm install,npm update,npxor a Docker build, and for the stringsplain-crypto-jsand[email protected]. - Search network and DNS logs for
sfrclak.com,142.11.206.73and outbound connections to port 8000.
Why the lockfile doesn't settle it
A clean lockfile proves less than it seems:
- Installs outside the lockfile.
npx,npm install -gin a setup step, andnpm installinside a Dockerfile or a build script all resolve versions on the spot. - Other branches and pull requests. A dependency update pull request that ran CI at 01:00 UTC on 31 March may have resolved axios to 1.14.1, even if it was never merged.
- The installed package lies about its version. Because the dropper rewrote its own
package.json,npm lsand tools that readnode_modulescan report[email protected].
You need a record of which package versions each build actually fetched. See are we affected? how to assess a new CVE across your builds and what a lockfile does and doesn't tell you.
How to fix it, and what to do if you can't patch yet
- If any machine or job installed an affected version, treat it as compromised. Rotate every secret it could read: npm and GitHub tokens, cloud credentials, deploy keys and anything in the job's environment, from a clean machine. For a developer machine, StepSecurity recommends isolating and rebuilding it rather than cleaning it.
- Move off the affected versions. The last clean versions before the attack were 1.14.0 and 0.30.3. The current releases, 1.21.1 and 0.35.0 on 16 November 2026, also fix CVE-2026-40175. Pin with
overrides(npm) orresolutions(Yarn) if a dependency pulls axios in. - Remove the dropper and clear caches:
rm -rf node_modules/plain-crypto-js
npm cache clean --force
gh cache delete --all --repo ORG/REPO # GitHub Actions caches, per repository
- Rebuild artifacts from jobs that installed an affected version, from a clean install.
- Block
sfrclak.comand142.11.206.73at your DNS, proxy or firewall.
Verify the cleanup
- No lockfile on any branch contains
plain-crypto-jsor axios 1.14.1 or 0.30.4. - No
node_modules/plain-crypto-jsdirectory remains on any developer machine or self-hosted runner. - The dropper's files are gone:
/Library/Caches/com.apple.act.mond(macOS),%PROGRAMDATA%\wt.exe(Windows),/tmp/ld.py(Linux). - The old credentials no longer work. Revoked npm tokens are gone from
npm token listand old cloud keys are deactivated, not just replaced. - The next build is clean. Check the versions it actually installed, from its log or per-build SBOM.
How to reduce the damage next time
- Wait before adopting new versions. The malicious versions were live for three hours. A cooldown on dependency updates, which Dependabot and Renovate support, would have kept them out. StepSecurity points to npm's
min-release-agesetting in npm 11.10.0 and later. - Turn off install scripts where you can.
npm ci --ignore-scriptswould have stopped this dropper. npm v12 disables install scripts by default. - Limit where builds can connect. A build needs its package registries and a few APIs. The dropper's call to
sfrclak.com:8000fails when that host isn't allowed. See how an egress policy stops exfiltration from GitHub Actions. StepSecurity's own detection came from a CI run that connected to a host it had never contacted before. - Publish only through trusted publishing. The malicious releases came from a long-lived token, not the project's release workflow.
Check for compromise
| Indicator | Where to look | Source |
|---|---|---|
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected] (or any version) | Lockfiles, CI logs, SBOMs | Postmortem |
A node_modules/plain-crypto-js directory | Machines and self-hosted runners | StepSecurity |
sfrclak.com, 142.11.206.73, port 8000, path /6202033 | DNS, proxy and firewall logs | Postmortem, StepSecurity |
/Library/Caches/com.apple.act.mond, /tmp/6202033 | macOS | StepSecurity |
%PROGRAMDATA%\wt.exe, %TEMP%\6202033.vbs, %TEMP%\6202033.ps1 | Windows | StepSecurity |
/tmp/ld.py, a python3 process started by nohup | Linux | StepSecurity |
When to assume compromise. If any of these turn up, or a job installed an affected version, treat it as compromised, even if you find nothing else: the dropper removed its own traces. On ephemeral GitHub-hosted runners the machine is gone, but the secrets the job could read are not; rotate them and review cloud audit logs from 31 March onward.
What to tell your customers
If you ship software built with npm, customers will ask whether your product or your release pipeline was affected:
We checked every build of [product] between 30 March and 1 April 2026 for axios 1.14.1 and 0.30.4 and for plain-crypto-js. [No build installed an affected version.] / [Builds of [component] on [date] installed [version]; we rotated the credentials those builds could access and rebuilt [product] from a clean install as release [version].] The malicious code ran at install time and was not included in the axios code shipped in our product.
Check the last sentence against your own build before you send it. For a first holding statement and templates for each outcome, see how to answer customers after a supply chain attack.
How CRACI helps
CRACI runs your GitHub Actions jobs on its own runners (runs-on: craci) and records every package each job actually fetches from npm and other registries, including the hidden dependencies that install scripts, npx and build scripts pull in. Build history keeps every past build with its SBOM, so you can see which builds contained an affected version and when, within your retention period (180 days by default).
CRACI's egress policy limits where a job can connect, is validated before the job starts and fails closed. A job allowed to reach only its registries and the APIs it needs could not have reached sfrclak.com:8000, even on the night of the attack, before anyone knew the host. You are alerted when a job tries to reach a destination the policy doesn't allow.
CRACI flags known malicious releases that have a published CVE, and policy gates can block builds that contain one. The axios releases have GitHub malware advisories but no CVE, so look them up in the package record. CRACI doesn't detect malicious packages by behavior or reputation.
See the package record of one of your own builds
Related incidents: the chalk and debug npm compromise, Shai-Hulud. Other incidents: all vulnerabilities.
Sources and updates
Primary sources:
- axios: postmortem by the lead maintainer, the issue that confirmed the compromise
- GitHub Advisory Database: GHSA-fw8c-xr5c-95f9, GHSA-2x9r-6wxq-hrr7
- npm registry: axios and plain-crypto-js publish times
- CVE record of the separate bug: CVE-2026-40175
Research:
- StepSecurity: technical analysis and indicators
- Google Threat Intelligence Group: attribution to UNC1069
- Datadog Security Labs: attack flow and response
Updates:
- 2026-11-16: First published.