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GlassWorm: the invisible-code worm in VS Code extensions and how to check whether you are affected

GlassWorm is a malware campaign that hides its code in invisible Unicode characters and spreads through extensions for VS Code and its forks, and later through GitHub repositories and npm packages. Koi Security first reported it on 18 October 2025, after seven extensions on Open VSX, the extension registry used by VSCodium, Cursor, Windsurf and other VS Code forks, were compromised the day before. It steals npm, GitHub, Open VSX and Git credentials and cryptocurrency wallets, turns infected machines into remote-controlled proxies, and uses the stolen tokens to publish more infected extensions and packages. It has come back in waves since. If a developer machine ran an infected extension, treat it as compromised and rotate every credential on it.

GlassWorm is mostly a developer-machine problem, not a CI one: the extensions run inside the editor. It reaches builds through what it steals. A stolen npm token can publish an infected package that your builds install, and a stolen GitHub token can push a commit with invisible code that your CI then runs. This page covers both sides.

What happened

WhenWaveSource
March 2025Aikido first finds npm packages hiding payloads in invisible Unicode characters, the technique GlassWorm later usesAikido
17–19 October 2025Seven Open VSX extensions are compromised on 17 October, starting with CodeJoy 1.8.3; Koi reports about 35,800 installs. On 19 October Koi finds an infected extension on Microsoft's VS Code MarketplaceKoi
21–27 October 2025The Eclipse Foundation removes the extensions, revokes the tokens, and declares the incident contained on 21 October. It says the tokens leaked through developer mistakes and that the install count was inflatedEclipse Foundation
31 October – 6 November 2025Aikido finds the same invisible-code loader in GitHub repositories; Koi reports three more infected Open VSX extensions with about 10,000 downloadsSecurityWeek
December 2025Three more Open VSX extensions, about 50,000 reported downloads, with a payload for macOS that collects the login Keychain and looks for Ledger Live and Trezor SuiteKoi
30 January 2026Four established extensions of the oorzc publisher get malicious versions; Open VSX deactivates the publisher's tokensSocket
31 January – 13 March 2026At least 72 more malicious Open VSX extensions, many installing the loader through extensionPack and extensionDependencies instead of carrying itSocket
3–12 March 2026At least 151 GitHub repositories get commits with invisible-code loaders, followed by npm packages and a VS Code extension on 12 MarchAikido
March 2026The npm package react-native-country-select is compromised with an install-time loader; the payload installs a Chrome extension that works as a remote access trojanAikido
April 2026A fake WakaTime extension on Open VSX drops a native binary that installs the loader into every VS Code-based editor on the machine; Socket tracks 73 "sleeper" extensions; 22 of them get new versions on 29 April, most of which pull in a malicious extensionAikido, Socket

The most recent wave we could verify in the researchers' own publications was in April 2026. The download counts in these reports are installs of the extensions, not confirmed infections, and the Eclipse Foundation says the October 2025 figure "overstates the actual number of affected users."

Who is affected

  • Developers who installed an infected extension in VS Code, VS Code Insiders, Cursor, Windsurf, VSCodium, Positron or another VS Code-based editor, from Open VSX or, less often, from Microsoft's VS Code Marketplace. Editors update extensions automatically, so a clean extension installed months ago could have received a malicious update.
  • Anyone who cloned and ran a repository that received one of the invisible-code commits, or installed one of the infected npm packages, including CI jobs.
  • Organizations whose developers were infected, because the tokens on those machines give access to your GitHub organization, your npm packages and your cloud accounts.

How it works

  • Invisible code. The loader is encoded in Unicode variation selectors (U+FE00 to U+FE0F and U+E0100 to U+E01EF), which render as nothing. Aikido shows the decoder: it maps those code points to bytes and passes the result to eval(Buffer.from(...).toString('utf-8')). Koi notes the code is invisible in editors and diffs but "still executable by the JavaScript interpreter."
  • Blockchain command and control. The loader reads the address of the next stage from the memo field of transactions sent by a Solana wallet, with a Google Calendar event as a backup. A blockchain transaction can't be taken down, so the operators can move their servers by posting a new transaction.
  • Credential theft. According to Koi, the payload takes npm tokens, GitHub tokens, Open VSX credentials and Git credentials, and targets 49 cryptocurrency wallet browser extensions.
  • Remote control. The final stage, which Koi calls ZOMBI, turns the machine into a SOCKS proxy and adds hidden remote desktop access (HVNC). Later waves installed a Chrome extension that logs keystrokes and dumps cookies.
  • Spreading. Stolen tokens are used to publish infected versions of the victim's own extensions and packages and to push commits to their repositories. In the March 2026 GitHub wave, the malicious commits were dressed up as documentation tweaks, version bumps and small fixes.
  • Delivery through dependencies. From early 2026, many extensions carried no payload themselves: they declared an extensionPack or extensionDependencies entry that made the editor install a separate malicious extension. Socket's "sleeper" extensions were published clean and turned malicious through a later update.

How to check whether you are affected

On developer machines, list the installed extensions and versions of every VS Code-based editor:

code --list-extensions --show-versions
cursor --list-extensions --show-versions
codium --list-extensions --show-versions

Compare them with the indicator lists in the researchers' reports: Koi's for October and December 2025, Socket's for January to April 2026 and Aikido's for March and April 2026. Then search the installed extensions for the decoder and for long runs of variation selectors. Single variation selectors are normal after emoji; runs of ten or more are not:

for dir in ~/.vscode/extensions ~/.vscode-insiders/extensions ~/.cursor/extensions \
           ~/.windsurf/extensions ~/.vscode-oss/extensions; do
  [ -d "$dir" ] || continue
  LC_ALL=C.UTF-8 grep -rlP '[\x{FE00}-\x{FE0F}\x{E0100}-\x{E01EF}]{10,}' "$dir" --include='*.js'
  grep -rlE '0xFE00.{0,40}0xFE0F|0xE0100.{0,40}0xE01EF' "$dir" --include='*.js'
done

In your repositories, run the same search over the working tree and look at recent commits from accounts that belong to your developers but don't look like their work:

LC_ALL=C.UTF-8 git grep -nP '[\x{FE00}-\x{FE0F}\x{E0100}-\x{E01EF}]{10,}'
git grep -nE '0xFE00.{0,40}0xFE0F|0xE0100.{0,40}0xE01EF'

In your dependencies, search lockfiles on every branch for the npm packages named in the reports, and check whether any build installed them. A clean lockfile doesn't cover packages installed with npx or inside build scripts.

In your GitHub organization, review audit logs for pushes, force pushes, new tokens and new deploy keys from the accounts of developers whose machines may be infected.

How to fix it, and what to do if you can't patch yet

There is nothing to patch: GlassWorm is malicious code, not a bug.

  1. Remove infected extensions from every editor on the machine, including the extensions they pulled in as dependencies, and disable automatic updates until you've checked.
  2. Treat an infected machine as compromised. The payload installs a remote access trojan and persistence, such as Windows Run registry keys and macOS LaunchAgents. Rebuild the machine rather than cleaning it.
  3. Rotate every credential the machine held, from a clean machine: npm tokens, GitHub tokens and SSH keys, Open VSX and VS Code Marketplace publisher tokens, Git credentials, cloud keys and anything in the developer's shell environment. Move cryptocurrency out of wallets that were on the machine.
  4. Revert malicious commits and check whether any package or extension was published with the stolen tokens. Deprecate or unpublish infected versions and tell your users.

Verify the cleanup

  1. No infected extension is installed in any editor on the machine, by the commands above.
  2. The searches for the decoder and for runs of variation selectors return nothing in extensions and repositories.
  3. The old credentials no longer work: revoked npm tokens are gone from npm token list, old GitHub tokens and SSH keys are deleted and publisher tokens are revoked.
  4. No release you published after the infection contains code you didn't write. Compare published packages with their Git tags.

Check for compromise

The indicators change with every wave, so use the report for the wave you're checking. From the researchers' own publications:

WaveIndicatorsSource
October 2025Solana wallet 28PKnu7RzizxBzFPoLp69HLXp9bJL3JFtT2s5QzHsEA2; servers 217.69.3.218, 199.247.10.166, 140.82.52.31, 199.247.13.106; extensions including codejoy.codejoy-vscode-extension 1.8.3 and 1.8.4 and cline-ai-main.cline-ai-agent 3.1.3Koi
January 2026oorzc.ssh-tools 0.5.1, oorzc.i18n-tools-plus 1.6.8, oorzc.mind-map 1.0.61, oorzc.scss-to-css-compile 1.3.4Socket
March 2026Solana wallets BjVeAjPrSKFiingBn4vZvghsGj9KCE8AJVtbc9S8o8SC and 6YGcuyFRJKZtcaYCCFba9fScNUvPkGXodXE1mJiSzqDJ; servers 45.32.150.251, 45.32.151.157, 70.34.242.255Socket
March 2026npm @aifabrix/miso-client 4.7.2 and @iflow-mcp/watercrawl-watercrawl-mcp 1.3.0 to 1.3.4; extension quartz.quartz-markdown-editor 0.3.0Aikido
March 2026A Chrome extension posing as "Google Docs Offline", version 1.95.1Aikido
April 2026Open VSX extension specstudio/code-wakatime-activity-tracker with a native win.node or mac.node binary, and a second-stage autoimport-2.7.9.vsixAikido

Connections from developer machines or build jobs to Solana RPC endpoints are also worth a look if nothing you use talks to Solana. Later waves geofence out Russian locales and wait before running, so a quick test in a sandbox can come back clean.

When to assume compromise. Treat any machine that ran an infected extension or package as compromised, from the date the malicious version was installed, even if you find no indicator: the payload is built to stay hidden.

What to tell your customers

Customers are most likely to ask whether GlassWorm reached your products through your developers' credentials:

We checked our developers' machines and editor extensions, our repositories and our published [packages / extensions] against the published GlassWorm indicators up to [date]. [We found no infected extension or malicious commit.] / [We found [finding] on [date]; we rebuilt the affected machine, rotated its credentials and checked that no release was published with them. Releases [x to y] are not affected.] We will update this notice if new waves change the picture.

For a first holding statement and templates for each outcome, see how to answer customers after a supply chain attack.

How CRACI helps

CRACI's part here is limited, and it's worth being plain about it. CRACI runs your GitHub Actions jobs on its own runners; it doesn't run on developer laptops and doesn't see editor extensions, which is where GlassWorm mainly spreads. It doesn't detect malicious code by behavior or reputation, and it flags known malicious releases only once an advisory with a CVE exists. GlassWorm has none.

Where CRACI helps is the CI side:

  • Builds that pulled an infected package. CRACI records every package each job actually fetches from npm, including hidden dependencies that install scripts and npx pull in. When a report names an infected package, you look it up across your builds instead of reconstructing installs from lockfiles. Build history keeps every past build with its SBOM, within your retention period (180 days by default).
  • Invisible code that reaches a build. If a stolen token pushes an infected commit or publishes an infected package and a build runs it, the loader has to reach its servers. CRACI's egress policy limits where a job can connect, is validated before the job starts and fails closed, so a build that may reach only its registries and the APIs it needs can't fetch the next stage or send stolen secrets to a host it doesn't need, even in a wave nobody has seen yet. You are alerted when a job tries.

See where your builds connect

More: how an egress policy stops exfiltration from GitHub Actions, typosquatting and impersonation. Related incidents: Shai-Hulud, the axios npm compromise. Other incidents: all vulnerabilities.

Sources and updates

Original research and primary sources:

Coverage:

Updates:

  • 2026-11-16: First published.

Frequently asked questions

What is GlassWorm?

A malware campaign, first reported by Koi Security on 18 October 2025, that hides its code in invisible Unicode characters. It spreads mainly through extensions for VS Code and its forks on Open VSX and the VS Code Marketplace, and later through GitHub repositories and npm packages. It steals npm, GitHub, Open VSX and Git credentials and cryptocurrency wallets and uses the stolen tokens to publish more infected extensions and packages.

How does GlassWorm hide its code?

It encodes the loader in Unicode variation selectors, characters that render as nothing in editors, diffs and code review. A small decoder turns them back into JavaScript and runs it with eval. To a reviewer the line looks empty or like an ordinary string.

Is GlassWorm a worm?

Researchers call it one because it uses credentials stolen from each victim to publish more infected extensions and packages. The Eclipse Foundation, which runs Open VSX, says the October 2025 wave was not a self-replicating worm in the traditional sense and that its tokens leaked through developer mistakes. Either way, each infected developer's tokens can become the next way in.

Is GlassWorm still active?

It has returned in waves: October and November 2025, December 2025 on macOS, January to April 2026 on Open VSX, and a GitHub and npm wave in March 2026. The most recent wave we could verify in the researchers' own publications was in April 2026.

Does GlassWorm affect CI pipelines?

Its main target is developer machines through editor extensions. CI is exposed in two ways: tokens stolen from developers can publish infected npm packages or push commits that builds then run, and a build that installs an infected npm package runs its loader. Builds don't install editor extensions, so the original Open VSX vector doesn't reach CI directly.

Does GlassWorm have a CVE?

No. It is a malware campaign, not a vulnerability. Individual infected npm packages may get GitHub malware advisories, but the campaign as a whole has no CVE and is not in CISA's KEV catalog.